Research archive
Research
Formal publications, open-source research tools, and field notes, newest first. Design proposals are labeled as such; nothing here claims results it has not measured.
Papers
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Ghost Portal Cartographer
Evidence-tiered mapping of indirect sensitive-data egress.
Ghost Portal Cartographer analyzes a finite, declared artifact-version graph without reading payload contents. Three independently budgeted searches distinguish reported scalar-ordered lineage, reported lineage with unresolved order, and possible data or unknown-content reachability. A route found by one search is never erased by another search's limit, trace parentage is diagnostic only, and an authenticated transformation claim never removes a route. Version 1.0.0 includes a standard-library Python kernel, 171 tests, two separately coded oracles, exhaustive small-graph enumeration, eleven detected deliberate mutations, a research paper, and checksum-verified artifacts.
Cite this paper
Thor, T. (2026). Ghost Portal Cartographer: Evidence-Tiered Mapping of Indirect Sensitive-Data Egress (1.0.0). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24267416 -
RIFT: Reach-Invariant Firewall for Trust
An executable static kernel for pre-commit information-flow certification.
RIFT evaluates whether proposed changes to a finite, trusted information-flow graph introduce prohibited reachability between protected facts and forbidden sinks. Version 0.1.1 includes an executable Python reference implementation, 37 regression tests, an independent bounded DFS oracle over 512 states and 3,072 single-edge proposals, an illustrated paper, and checksum-verified research artifacts. Every edge removal returns UNKNOWN; secure revocation is not supported.
Cite this paper
Thor, T. (2026). RIFT: Reach-Invariant Firewall for Trust - An Executable Static Kernel for Pre-Commit Information-Flow Certification (0.1.1). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24239735 -
ECHO TRACE: AirPods 4 ANC Firmware-Update Observability
A macOS UARP case study in a single-earbud configuration.
An independent single-device case study of an AirPods 4 ANC A3056 still reporting 8B21 while family firmware 9A348 and a matching cached macOS UARP asset were available. It combines host-state verification, sanitized observations, and bounded direct-transport trials without establishing a successful update or a firmware defect.
Cite this paper
Thor, T. (2026). Firmware-Update Observability in a Single-Earbud AirPods 4 ANC Configuration: A macOS UARP Case Study of Asset Discovery, Update Initiation, Device-State Verification, and Bounded Direct-Transport Diagnostics (1.0). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24056722 -
The Agent Security Control Plane
Toward a Zero-Trust Architecture for Autonomous Machine Cognition.
A zero-trust reference architecture and evidence synthesis for autonomous agents. ASCP separates model reasoning from authorization, distinguishes vertical authority attenuation from horizontal specialist handoff, requires complete mediation at the actual effect boundary, models correlated multi-agent failure without assuming independence, and explicitly preserves authorized-but-harmful behavior as residual risk.
Cite this paper
Thor, T. (2026). The Agent Security Control Plane: Toward a Zero-Trust Architecture for Autonomous Machine Cognition. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23146801 -
Memory-Egress Cryptographic Interlock (MECI)
A Hardware-Enforced Capability-Separation Model for AI Memory Security.
A hardware-oriented formal model for separating unreleased protected AI memory from gated egress authority. It defines reflexive-transitive high-to-egress reachability, a generation-checked SafeOpen transition, cryptographic epoch non-resurrection, and noninterference modulo authorized release. The finite safety core is checked by TLC and an independent reference checker; no hardware prototype or measured performance is claimed.
Cite this paper
Thor, T. (2026). Memory-Egress Cryptographic Interlock: A Hardware-Enforced Capability-Separation Model for AI Memory Security (1.0.0). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23109676 -
Mission-Invariant Architecture Morphing (MIAM)
Service-Graph Reconfiguration Against Post-Access Reconnaissance, with Cryptographic Epoch Isolation and Mission-Domain State Continuity.
A design proposal and formal model. It develops a reconnaissance-transfer model, architecture-distance measures, a recurrence-aware retention model, per-epoch cryptographic isolation, a graph-delta-driven State Continuity Firewall, and an ablation-based evaluation protocol. It reports no empirical results.
Cite this paper
Thor, T. (2026). Mission-Invariant Architecture Morphing: Service-Graph Reconfiguration Against Post-Access Reconnaissance, with Cryptographic Epoch Isolation and Mission-Domain State Continuity (1.0.0). Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23001045
Tools and reference implementations
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Model Identity Verifier
Analyzes LLM identity drift, suspicious provider or route mismatch, and downgrade or substitution signals, and separates behavioral checks from cryptographic attestation.
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LLM Agent Control Plane
Keeps authorization, policy, approvals, provenance checks, filtering, and audit logging outside the model. Agents propose; the control plane decides.
Authorization flow -
Security Stack Engineering (SSE)
Multi-layer reference architecture for governed and measurable security operations. Background: the SSE essay.
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Impact Forecast Algorithm (IFA)
Bayesian-inspired implementation for updating material-impact probability from explicit evidence likelihood ratios.
Field notes
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OAuth anomaly baseline
Flags unusual OAuth grant behavior by comparing per-user token activity against a rolling baseline, surfacing uncommon client and scope combinations for review.
Splunk SPL
index=authentication sourcetype=oauth:token | stats dc(client_id) AS clients dc(scope) AS scopes count BY user | eventstats avg(count) AS avg_grant stdev(count) AS stdev_grant BY user | eval threshold=avg_grant+(3*stdev_grant) | where count > threshold AND clients > 1 -
LLM agent authorization boundary
The agent may propose an action, but authorization belongs in a separate policy layer with identity context, allow and deny decisions, and audit logging.
Pattern
decision = control_plane.authorize(action, identity, policy) if decision.allowed: audit.log(action, identity, "allowed") tool.execute(action) else: audit.log(action, identity, "blocked")