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The Agent Security Control Plane
Toward a Zero-Trust Architecture for Autonomous Machine Cognition.
Research status
Open-source architecture-and-evidence synthesis. ASCP is a proposed reference architecture, not a production standard or an end-to-end validated system. It treats model reasoning as untrusted compute, moves consequential authority to deterministic external control boundaries, and keeps authorized-but-harmful behavior and control-plane compromise inside the residual-risk model.
Abstract
Autonomous software agents increasingly combine language-model reasoning with browsers, code execution, APIs, credentials, enterprise systems, and other effectful capabilities. That combination creates a security problem larger than prompt injection alone: a manipulated model can become a confused deputy if the same component that interprets untrusted semantics also serves as the effective authorization root.
The Agent Security Control Plane (ASCP) proposes a four-plane reference architecture built around identity and delegation, deterministic policy decision, policy enforcement at network and local effect boundaries, and observability and provenance. The paper formalizes sponsor-preserving delegation, vertical authority attenuation and horizontal specialist handoff, complete mediation, revocation, effect-level accountability, correlated multi-agent risk, and explicit residual-risk boundaries. It is presented as a testable architecture-and-evidence synthesis rather than a claim of production validation or a finished standard.
Known limitations
- ASCP is a proposed reference architecture and has not been benchmarked or validated end to end as a production system.
- Deterministic authorization bounds structured effects but does not solve semantic alignment; an authenticated and authorized action can still be harmful inside delegated scope.
- A compromised policy decision point, policy enforcement point, policy artifact, or privileged local bypass remains a high-value failure mode.
- Complete mediation fails if a consequential local or network effect can bypass the enforcement boundary.
- The normalized policy-risk score is a heuristic for policy thresholds, not a calibrated probability of compromise without deployment validation.
- Correlated multi-agent risk depends on shared models, frameworks, prompts, credentials, policy code, and other common-cause dependencies that require empirical measurement in real deployments.
Summarized from the paper. The full list is in its section on limitations, failure modes, and open research problems.
Artifacts
- DOI10.5281/zenodo.23146801
- PaperPDF
- SourcePaper source and reproducibility artifacts
- ArchiveZenodo record
- AuthorORCID 0009-0001-6573-385X
Cite this work
Plain text
Thor, T. (2026). The Agent Security Control Plane: Toward a Zero-Trust
Architecture for Autonomous Machine Cognition. Zenodo.
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23146801
BibTeX
@misc{thor2026ascp,
author = {Thor, Thor},
title = {The Agent Security Control Plane: Toward a Zero-Trust Architecture for Autonomous Machine Cognition},
year = {2026},
publisher = {Zenodo},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23146801},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23146801}
}